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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Martin Guzman Ambriz appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence. On appeal, Ambriz
claims the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ambriz drank approximately eight beers at his home and then began
driving. (R., p. 92.) When Ambriz made a turn, both of his passenger side tires
went off the roadway and onto the gravel on the side of the road. (Id.) Deputy
Zalewski and Deputy Reusze both observed Ambriz‟s vehicle leave the roadway.
(Id.) Both deputies also then saw Ambriz‟s vehicle quickly jerk from side to side
within its lane. (Id.) The deputies initiated a traffic stop. (Id.)
Ambriz failed field sobriety tests and Ambriz‟s breath results were .209,
insufficient, and .195.

(R., p. 10.)

Because Ambriz had previously been

convicted of felony DUI in 2010, the state charged Ambriz with felony DUI. (R.,
pp. 40-42.)
Ambriz filed a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic
stop. (R., p. 60.) Ambriz claimed the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. (Id.) The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.
83-84.)
Deputy Zalewski testified that when Ambriz‟s vehicle made a right hand
turn, both of his right tires fully went off the roadway and onto the gravel.
(9/28/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 – p. 8, L. 2, p. 15, Ls. 8-11.) She further testified that the
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vehicle then started making a “jerking motion.”

(9/28/15 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 3-8.)

Deputy Zalewski‟s police vehicle was equipped with a dashboard camera.
(9/28/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 6 – p. 11, L. 24.) The dashboard camera started recording
after Ambriz‟s right tires fully went off the roadway. (Id.)
Deputy Reusze also testified that she saw Ambriz‟s vehicle drive off the
road into the gravel. (9/28/15 Tr., p. 30, L. 18 – p. 31, L. 8.) Ambriz testified.
(9/28/15 Tr., p. 40, L. 19 – p. 47, L. 5.) Ambriz denied leaving the roadway and
driving on the gravel. (9/28/15 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 10-22.) He also denied making any
jerking motions with his car. (9/28/15 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 1-3.) Ambriz admitted to
drinking approximately eight beers before he drove. (9/28/15 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 222.)
The district court denied Ambriz‟s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 91-96.)
The district court analyzed the credibility of the witnesses and determined that
the deputies‟ testimony regarding Ambriz‟s driving pattern was reliable and
credible. (R., p. 95.) The district court also found, in part because of Ambriz‟s
alcohol consumption, that his “ability to clearly perceive and accurately recall the
events surrounding the stop at issue is questionable.” (Id.) The district court
concluded:
As set forth above, the deputies testified that the Defendant drove
in the gravel on the side of 16th Street and made quick, jerky
movements within his lane on Pomerelle Avenue. This driving
pattern was not within the broad range of normal driving behaviors.
In considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputies had
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to
traffic laws or that other criminal activity was afoot. Therefore, the
State met its burden of establishing that the stop of the Defendant‟s
vehicle was an investigatory detention based upon reasonable
suspicion and that it was therefore reasonable and lawful.
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(R., p. 95.)
Ambriz pled guilty to felony DUI, but reserved the right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp. 102-103; 12/22/15 Tr., p. 8, L. 17 – p.
9, L. 16.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Ambriz to seven
years with two years fixed but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 136-138; 2/16/16 Tr.,
p. 11, L. 2 – p. 13, L. 14.) Ambriz filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 140-141.)
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ISSUE
Ambriz states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ambriz‟s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant‟s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Ambriz failed to show the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Ambriz Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion
To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Ambriz claims the district court erred when it held the deputies had

reasonable suspicion that Ambriz‟s vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic
laws or that other criminal activity was afoot. Contrary to Ambriz‟s argument, the
district court did not err. The deputies observed both of Ambriz‟s passenger side
tires completely leave the roadway. Ambriz‟s vehicle then jerked within its lane
of travel.

The district court correctly found that deputies had reasonable

articulable suspicion to believe that Ambriz had violated traffic laws or that other
criminal activity was afoot.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court‟s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

The power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
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implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
C.

The District Court Correctly Found That The Deputies Had Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion To Stop Ambriz‟s Vehicle
The district court made a factual finding that the deputies observed

Ambriz‟s passenger-side tires drive off the roadway (R., pp. 92-95.) The district
also found that Ambriz drove on the gravel and made jerking movements within
his lane. (Id.) The district court determined that Ambriz‟s “driving pattern was
not within the broad range of normal driving behaviors.” (R., p. 95.) The district
court considered the totality of the circumstances and held “the deputies had a
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws or
that other criminal activity was afoot.” (Id.) As a result, the traffic stop was
based upon reasonable suspicion and “therefore reasonable and lawful.” (Id.)
The district court correctly applied the law to the facts when it denied Ambriz‟s
motion to suppress.
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle‟s occupants
and implicates the Fourth Amendment‟s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by
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an officer‟s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203
P.3d at 1210. “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws.” Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). “Reasonable suspicion requires
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the
officer.” State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010)
(citation omitted).
On appeal, Ambriz argues that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion
because his driving behavior “did not fall outside the broad range of what can be
described as normal” and the “State did not establish, or even argue, that Mr.
Ambriz committed a traffic violation.” (Appellant‟s brief, p. 6.) Both of Ambriz‟s
arguments fail to establish the district court erred.
In support of his first argument, Ambriz cites to State v. Emory, 119 Idaho
661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition that Ambriz‟s driving
pattern fell within the broad range of normal driving behavior. (See Appellant‟s
brief, pp. 7-9 (citing Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525).) Contrary to
Ambriz‟s argument on appeal, Emory did not create a “normal driving behavior”
exception to traffic laws. State v. Morris, 159 Idaho 651, 656, 365 P.3d 407, 412
(Ct. App. 2015), review denied (Feb. 23, 2016). As explained by the Idaho Court
of Appeals in Morris:
Emory did not create a “normal driving behavior” exception to traffic
laws. We merely used the phrase to denote that the officer had not
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seen any activity that would support reasonable suspicion that the
driver was under the influence of an intoxicant.
Id. Further, Emory is easily distinguished because Emory never left his lane.
See Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525 (“Emory‟s vehicle was in its
proper lane and was moving in a straight line down the street. No weaving or
crossing of the center dividing line was observed by the officer.”). Here, the
deputies saw Ambriz‟s vehicle leave its lane. (See R., p. 92.)
The facts here are closer to Morris, where the Idaho Court of Appeals
distinguished Emory, and held there was reasonable suspicion to stop Morris
because the officers witnessed the vehicle leave its lane. Morris, 159 Idaho at
656, 365 P.3d at 412.
In contrast to Emory, the patrol officer witnessed Morris leave his
lane when there was no circumstance that would have made it
infeasible to drive in Morris‟ lane. At this point, the patrol officer had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in that he had witnessed
Morris commit a traffic violation.
Id.
In addition to leaving the roadway, Ambriz‟s vehicle also quickly jerked
from side to side within its lane. (See R., p. 92.) Jerking movements within the
lane of travel can contribute to an abnormal driving pattern that supports a
finding of reasonable suspicion. See State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 11, 878
P.2d 184, 185 (Ct. App. 1994) abrogated on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135
Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000). In Naccarato, the defendant was “jerking the
vehicle to correct its motion in one direction or the other” but the vehicle did not
actually leave its lane. Id. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, which
included this “jerking” within the lane, the magistrate and district court found
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there was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.

Id.

The Idaho Court of

Appeals affirmed. Id. Likewise, in this case, the district court‟s findings that
Ambriz‟s vehicle left the roadway and made jerking movements supports its
conclusion that the deputies had reasonable suspicion to stop Ambriz.
Ambriz‟s vehicle leaving it‟s lane of travel and driving on the gravel outside
the roadway also constituted a traffic violation. “Idaho Code section 49–630(1)
requires that drivers drive on the right half of the roadway.” State v. Slater, 136
Idaho 293, 298, 32 P.3d 685, 690 (Ct. App. 2001). “The „roadway‟ means that
portion of a highway that is „improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular
travel.‟” Id. (citing I.C. § 49–119(18)). The roadway does not include “sidewalks,
shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way.” Id. Therefore driving outside the lane and
off the roadway constitutes a violation of Idaho Code § 49–630(1). See e.g.
Slater, 136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690 (“Accordingly, when Officer Burns
observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit fleetingly, Burns now possessed
the requisite reasonable suspicion that Slater had violated I.C. § 49–630 by
driving on the shoulder of the highway, rather than on the „roadway.‟”); State v.
Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 445, 362 P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (holding no traffic violation
where Neal did not drive on the shoulder outside of the roadway). Here, the
district court found that Ambriz‟s vehicle left the roadway. (See, e.g., R., p. 92
(“Both deputies testified that they saw Defendant‟s vehicle go off the roadway
with at least the passenger-side tires in the gravel on the side of the road. The
vehicle then returned to the roadway and turned right onto Pomerelle Avenue.”).)
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In addition to violating Idaho Code § 49–630(1) by leaving the roadway,
Ambriz also violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1), which requires a driver to drive “as
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.” Here, by driving on the gravel
outside of his lane, Ambriz also violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1).
On appeal, Ambriz argues that, because neither the state nor the district
court pointed to a specific statute that Ambriz violated, the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop him. (See Appellant‟s brief, p. 10.) Reasonable
suspicion does not depend on whether the state or district court cited a particular
code section during the hearing on the motion to suppress. Whether there is
reasonable articulable suspicion that a defendant committed a traffic violation is
determined based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at
the time of the stop. See, e.g., Morris, 159 Idaho at 654, 365 P.3d at 410. Here,
under the totality of the circumstances, the deputies had reasonable articulable
suspicion that Ambriz committed a traffic violation when both his passenger tires
fully left the roadway.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2016.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of September, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing
an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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